Attorney General v Gill

• Jurisdiction: Barbados
• Judge: Hanschell, J.,Williams, J.
• Judgment Date: 28 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 24 of 1972
• Date: 28 July 1972
• Court: Divisional Court (Barbados)

Divisional Court

Hanschell, J.; and Williams, J.

No. 24 of 1972

Attorney General

and

Gill

Appearances:

O.M. Browne, Q.C., Solicitor General, and S. Reid for the appellant.

L. Bolden for the respondent.

Industrial Law - Contract of employment — Summary dismissal

Facts: This was an appeal by the Attorney General against a decision of the magistrate in favour of the respondent for wrongful dismissal — The issue was whether the respondent was liable to dismissal at will since no special protection was given him by statute

Held: This point could properly be raised on appeal and it would be allowed — Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

1 This appeal arises out of a suit brought in the Magistrates Court of District “A” by Mr. Fred Gill of Sugar Hill, St. Joseph, against the Attorney General as the representative of the Crown. His grievance was dismissal without cause and his claim for a month's salary due and a month's salary in lieu of notice.

2 The matter began with an advertisement by the Ministry of Agriculture in the Advocate News. They were looking for an overseer for the soil conservation scheme. Mr. Gill saw the advertisement and on July 8, 1970, he applied on the site to one Mr. White for the job. He started work next morning and continued throughout the day. Before he left, Mr. White, who had been speaking on the telephone for a long time, told him “to hold off for a little time till further notice”. Mr. Gill said that he took this to mean that he should not return to work until he got further notice. Accordingly he did not do so. In April, 1971, he received a cheque for two days' salary — $19.35 — which he never cashed.

3 He views the matter in this way:

• (1) he applied to Mr. White in answer to the advertisement and was engaged by Mr. White at the monthly salary of $300;

• (2) he worked satisfactorily for the first day of his employment and gave no cause for dismissal. He stated in his evidence that Mr. White had inspected his work and said that it was all right;

• (3) in the circumstances, being engaged at a monthly salary, he was entitled to a whole month's pay and in addition, to a month's pay in lieu of notice.

4 The magistrate saw the matter in the same light and gave judgment for Mr. Gill for $600 and costs. We quote his words:

“The plaintiff claimed in his evidence mainly that he had been appointed at a salary of $300 per month by the Crown through their agent Mr. White and that he was entitled to the normal monthly employees' right of a month's pay and a month's notice, unless his employers could prove some fault on his part. So far as the court was concerned, in the absence of evidence by the Crown, the plaintiff's evidence stood unchallenged. He asked for the job. He got it. He worked. He was offered payment for his work. The only real question for the court to decide was whether the compensation offered was adequate in the eyes of the law and the court did not think so.”

5 Before us counsel for the appellant set out to show that the approach of the magistrate could not be sustained in law. At one stage he sought to rely on a defence under the Statute of Limitations but he did not pursue it. The submission on which he eventually relied can be put thus:

• (1) Mr. Gill as an employee of the Crown was not entitled to any notice of dismissal or any payment in lieu thereof. No statute can be shown to give him my special protection from dismissal at will. Counsel relied on Shenton v. Smith [1895] A.C. 229 and A.-A. forGuyana v. Nobrega (1970) 15 W.I.R. 51.

• (2) Mr. Gill had only served one day and his claim against the Crown could only succeed to this extent. And the Crown had long ago tendered in settlement $19.35 which was more than he was due in law.

6 Counsel for the respondent did not seek to challenge the first part of this submission. However, he submitted that the Crown's power to dismiss at will had not been raised at the trial...