Beckles v Springer
| Jurisdiction | Barbados |
| Judge | Williams, C.J. |
| Judgment Date | 13 April 1992 |
| Neutral Citation | BB 1992 CA 14 |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1990 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Barbados) |
| Date | 13 April 1992 |
Court of Appeal
Williams, J.A.; Husbands, J.A.; Moe, J.A.
Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1990
Dr. R.L. Cheltenham, Q.C., in association with Miss L. Thompson for the appellant.
Mr. Peter Williams, Q.C., in association with Mr. D. King and Miss R. Bynoe for the respondent.
Restitution - Deed of gift — Whether deed of gift of land and house standing on it should be set aside on the ground of undue influence — Whether foreclosure suit should be used.
This is an appeal by Violet Beckles, administratrix of the estate of the late Beatrice Henry and residuary legatee in Henry's will, against the decision of King, J., [acting] in which he gave judgment for the defendant, Bertram Springer, on her claim for the relief set out in the Statement of Claim, namely –
-
(a) a declaration that she is entitled to certain property at Lakes Folly, St. Michael, by virtue of being residuary legatee of Henry's will;
-
(b) a declaration that a certain deed of gift made by Henry to the defendant is void and of no effect;
-
(c) an order for possession of the Lakes Folly property;
-
(d) alternatively, a declaration that the deed of gift is void by reason of undue influence brought to bear by the defendant on Henry;
-
(e) an account of all dealings by the defendant with the property and compensation for its use and occupation from the date of possession until its delivery up;
-
(f) further or other relief; and
-
(g) costs.
The plaintiff's complaint is against the whole of the decision and the grounds of appeal allege the following errors of law –
- In holding that Henry's titling of the land did not overreach any interest in the land which the defendant may have acquired by virtue of the deed of gift; 2. in holding that the defendant's failure to respond to the advertisement of the property made pursuant to proceedings under the Judicial Sale of Land Act did not estop him in law from claiming the property; 3. in not holding that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the property; 4. in not holding that the deed of gift is void by reason of undue influence brought to bear by the defendant on Henry; and 5. in not holding that the plaintiff is entitled to the property by virtue of being the residuary legatee of Henry's will.
At the centre of the dispute is a deed of gift of 141.6 square metres of land at Lakes Folly, St. Michael, and the house standing on it, which was executed on May 6, 1983 by Henry in favour of the defendant. The deed recited that Henry was the estate owner of the fee simple absolute in possession free from encumbrances and was minded to grant and convey the land to Springer. It went on to witness that, in pursuance of the said desire and in consideration of the natural love and affection which Henry had and bore “for her dear son” Springer and for divers other causes and considerations, and in further consideration of one hundred dollars paid by Springer to Henry [the receipt of which was thereby acknowledged by Henry], Henry as beneficial owner did thereby grant and convey the land to Springer and his heirs.
Henry was living on the property on the date of the gift as well as at the time of her death on December 13, 1985. The defendant too was living there on both of those dates and continued to live there after Henry's death. On January 24, 1986 application was made on his behalf to the Land Valuation Department to have ownership of the land transferred from Henry's name to his by virtue of the deed of gift and the Department amended its records accordingly. He still lives on the property.
No issue has been raised on this appeal with respect to the subject matter of the gift.
The learned judge found that Henry had an equitable interest in the property and could convey only this to the defendant despite her description of herself in the deed of gift as the owner of the fee simple. He went on to hold that Henry had properly conveyed her interest to the defendant.
It seems to me that section 67 (1) of the Property Act, Cap. 236 makes it clear that the defendant would by virtue of the conveyance have got whatever interest Henry had in the property. That subsection provides as follows –
“67(1) Every conveyance is effectual to pass all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand which the conveying parties respectively have in, to or on the property conveyed or expressed or intended so to be, or which they have power to convey in, to or on the same.”
Some time in 1983 subsequent to the date of the deed of gift, Henry passed the land through the court or, in the more forensic language used by counsel, commenced and completed proceedings under the Judicial Sale of Land Act, Cap. 227 whereby the property became vested in her. Prior to the Registrar's conveyance to Henry, advertisement for claims should have been made so as to ascertain what estates, rights, interests, liens and encumbrances exist in or on or affect the land to be conveyed [see section 16(2)(a) of the Act] but the defendant did not put in a claim. His evidence is that he did not know of the advertisement.
On January 17, 1984 Henry executed a will in which she made several specific gifts and bequests and gave, devised and bequeathed to the plaintiff all the residue and remainder of her property both real and personal whatsoever and wheresoever situate not specifically disposed of by the will. The property at Lakes Folly was not mentioned in the will and would in normal circumstances go to the plaintiff as part of the residuary estate.
On June 19, 1986 the plaintiff took out letters of administration cum testamento annexo to Henry's estate and called on the defendant to vacate the premises by December 31, 1986. On his refusal she sought the relief of the court.
The following issues have been raised on this appeal:
-
(1) whether the deed of gift should be set aside on the ground of undue influence;
-
(2) whether Henry's titling of the land under the Judicial Sale of Land Act “overreached” any interest in the land that the defendant acquired by virtue of the deed of gift; and
-
(3) whether the defendant is now estopped from relying on the deed of gift by reason of his not having put in a claim when Henry was proceeding under the Judicial Sale of Land Act to obtain a Registrar's conveyance.
As was said by Slade, L.J. delivering the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. v. Aboody and Another [1989] 2 W.L.R. 759 at 768, 769 –
“Ever since the judgments of this court in Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch. D. 145 a clear distinction has been drawn between (1) those cases in which the court will uphold a plea of undue influence only if it is satisfied that such influence has been affirmatively proved on the evidence (commonly referred to as cases of ‘actual undue influence’ and, in argument before us, as ‘class 1’ cases); (2) those cases (commonly referred to as cases of ‘presumed undue influence’, and, in argument before us, as ‘class 2’ cases) in which the relationship between the parties will lead the court to presume that undue influence has been exerted unless evidence is adduced proving the contrary, e.g. by showing that the complaining party has had independent advice.”
In this case the findings of the learned trial judge make it absolutely clear that there was no undue influence actually exerted by the defendant on Henry. He said [at pp. 58, 59 of the record] –
“As I said earlier, I get the impression that the plaintiff virtually lived at the donor's house during these last years. She was there all the time performing myriad duties [the only thing she excluded was collecting rents], had become the donor's confidant, guardian etc. In the last years she saw no relationship between the donor and the defendant, yet she asks me to believe that though discredited, and at a time when she was exercising a dominant role, and her attorney-at-law, Mr. Smith, was visiting the donor regularly, the defendant was abusing his trust by exercising undue influence and pressure to make the donor execute a power of attorney and deed of gift in his favour. If this story is true, what opportunity would the defendant have had to do as is claimed? If the story is true, it is obvious that the plaintiff had taken over the defendant's place of trust and had assumed the dominant and persuasive role in the donor's life.”
And at p. 63:
“It comes out very strongly in the evidence that ‘in her last years’, and 1983 must be included in this, the defendant's influence over the donor had waned substantially and the plaintiff had replaced him. I am satisfied too that the plaintiff set about to achieve this end from the time she re-entered the donor's life in 1982 and poisoned her against the defendant by saying constantly that he wanted to rob her and that she was her flesh and blood, and, by taking on complete responsibility for the donor's welfare. It seems to me that, if anyone was capable of using, and was in a position to use, and used, undue influence on the donor, it was the plaintiff.
There was no evidence that the donee engaged in unfair and improper conduct, coercion or cheating and this case does not therefore fall within the first group as enunciated by Allcard v. Skinner.”
I think that consideration of whether the defendant should be presumed to have had undue influence over Henry, should start with a reference to Beanland v. Bradley 2 Sm. & Giff. 339 at 343 where the Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Stuart, said:
“It is said that the lessor being the grandfather of one of the lessees and father-in-law of the other, there existed such a confidential...
To continue reading
Request your trial