Form and function in the theory of private law

• Author: Ernest J. Weinrib
• Position: Professor of Law and Special Lecturer in Classics, University of Toronto, Canada
• Pages: 345-365

FORMANDFUNCTIONINTHETHEORYOFPRIVATE

LAW

ErnestJ.Weinrib*

Privatelawisafamiliarpractice,itsinstitutionalstructurewell

establishedanditsfundamental conceptswellknown.Yetits nature

remainsamatterofcontroversyamonglegal theorists.Inthislecture

IwanttooutlinewhatIconsidertobe thebasicdividewithinthis

controversy. Thedominantviewsees privatelawasalegalapparatus

that servescertainindependentlyjustifiablefunctions. Theoristsfrom

withinthisviewdifferintheirspecificationoftherelevantfunctions

(somefavourwealthmaximization,othersthepromotionofsocial

solidarity,otherscheapestcost-avoidance,otherscompensation,and

soon)andtheyalsodifferinthetradeofftobemadebetweenthese

functions,buttheyregardanalysisintermsofindependently

justifiablefunctionasinescapable.Thealternativeview,whichI

favour,focusesinsteadontheformoftherelationshipbetweenthe

parties.Theideaofformisseenasa wayofelucidatingthe

immanentlyrationalstructureofprivatelaw, andprivatelawis

regardedasintelligibletotheextentthatitcanbeunderstoodasa

manifestationofthatstructure.Thiscontrastbetweenformand

functionprovidesthethemeofmy remarks.

Anincidentat whichIwaspresent maybrieflyillustratethe

functionalistapproach.Several yearsagoRichardPosner,a pioneer

ProfessorofLaw and Special Lecturer inClassics, UniversityofToronto,

Canada.Thispaperwasdeliveredasthe FifthAnthonyBland Memorial

Lecture attheLawFaculty,UniversityoftheWest Indies,Cave HillCampus,

Barbados,WestIndies.

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346CaribbeanLawReview

intheeconomicanalysisoflaw,gaveapaperataLawand

EconomicsWorkshopattheUniversityofToronto.Onthisoccasion

hispaperpurportedtoshowhowintentfitsintotheeconomic

conceptionoftortlawasaregimeofcost-justifiedprecautions.

Drawingontheideathatprecautionsshouldbetakenwhenthecost

oftheprecautionsislessthanthegravityoftheprospectiveharm

discountedbyitsprobability,he arguedthat intentional harmisharm

thathasahighprobabilityofoccurring,andthattheconnectionof

intenttoprobabilityallowstheintentionaltortstobeanalysedin

economicterms.Seeninthislight,thelaw’streatmentofintent

servesthefunctionofpromotingeconomicefficiency.

Inthequestionperiodafterthepaper,Posnerwasaskedaboutthe

followingsituation.Supposethedefendant, wishingtoshootthe

plaintiff,firesathimfroma distancesogreat andwithskill sopoor

thatinjuryishighlyimprobable. Ifthedefendantnonetheless

succeedsinhittingtheplaintiff,has intentionalharmoccurred?The

pointofthequestionwastodrivea wedge betweentheideasofintent

andprobabilitythatPosnerhadlabouredtobringtogether.Inthe

questioner’s hypothetical,the probabilityofharmislow, andyettort

law'snotionofintent—theexecutingofapurposefortheproduction

ofatortiousconsequence-isundeniablypresent.Thepointofthe

questionwas,ofcourse,immediatelyapparenttoPosner,Aftera

shortbutembarrassingsilenceheresponded, “Well,Iguessnotheory

explainseverything.”

Thisresponseisworthcontemplating: what preciselyhad Posner's

theoryofintentfailedtoexplain?FromthetactthatPosner

subsequentlypublishedhispaperwithout advertingtothedifficulty