Greaves v New India Assurance Company Ltd
| Jurisdiction | Barbados |
| Judge | Williams, J |
| Judgment Date | 26 November 1975 |
| Neutral Citation | BB 1975 HC 17 |
| Docket Number | No. 78 of 1975 |
| Court | High Court (Barbados) |
| Date | 26 November 1975 |
High Court
Williams, J.
No. 78 of 1975
Mr. W.H.A. Hanschell, QC, and Mr. P.D.H. Williams for the plaintiff
J.M.G. Adams for the defendant.
Insurance - Motor Insurance.
Facts: Whether by virtue of Section 9 of the Motor Vehicle Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act, 1952 the insurer's liability to a third party was limited.
Held: That the obligation of the insurer was to pay over and above the limit under the policy, the cost of suit and the interest awarded without any limit.
The plaintiff is the widow of Cameron Seymour Greaves and on June 2, 1972 filed an action against Selwyn Griffith of Fustic Village, St. Lucy, claiming damages in respect of the death of her husband in a motor car collision on June 6, 1971. Mr. Griffith was the owner of car L-282, one of the vehicles involved in the collision.
On October 28, 1974, judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff and the other claimants in the suit against Mr. Griffith for $18,640.00 made up as follows: $7,500 for the plaintiff as widow, $1,500 for Armina Greaves, daughter; $4,000 for Michael Thompson, son; $5,000 for David Morgan, son; $640.00 special damages, funeral expenses. Interest was also ordered on the above sums at the rate of 8% per annum from September 28, 1973 until payment. It was further ordered that the plaintiff's costs be taxed, certified fit for two counsel and instructing solicitors and these costs were taxed and agreed at $4,000 and, according to the plaintiff, subsequently paid. However, neither the sums awarded nor the interest have been.
Mr. Griffith had at the time of the accident third party insurance with the defendant company. The action is brought against the defendant pursuant to section 9(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Act, 1952 No. 22 which reads:–
“9(1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under subsection (4) of section four of this Act in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be conveyed b a policy under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section (4) of this Act (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy., the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, and subject to any limitations on the total amount payable under the policy in consequence of the fourth, fifth and sixth provisos to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section four of this Act, pay to, the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable thereunder in respect of the liability, including any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.”
The effect of provisos (iv), (v) and (vi) of paragraph (b) of section 4(1) of the Act is not to require a policy under the Act to cover –
“(iv) liability in respect of the first twenty four dollars of any claim by any one person;
(v) liability in respect of any sum in excess of four thousand eight hundred dollars arising out of any claim by any one person; or
(i) liability in respect of any sum in excess of forty-eight thousand dollars arising out of the total claims for any one accident for each vehicle concerned.”
The first issue between the parties is whether the plaintiff has proved the circumstances which make the defendant company liable pursuant to section 9(1) above. She has done this amply. Mr. Selwyn Griffith gave evidence and said he was the owner of the car L.282 involved in the accident; that he had third party insurance an the car with the defendant company; that he had been issued with a certificate of insurance; that the car was a taxi; that for the purpose of the insurance anybody in his business was authorised to drive the car and Mr. Stanford who was driving the car at the time had authority from him to drive the car in the business; and that Mr. Standford and the passenger were killed in the accident. He was not cross-examined on any of this evidence. He testified that he had made a search for the insurance policy and had been unable to find it. The secondary evidence given by him and by Mr. Cheeseman, manager of the defendant's office in Barbados, as the contents of the policy could therefore be properly considered to find out the provisions of the policy. Mr. Cheeseman had dealt with Mr. Griffith when the policy was taken out. Mr. Griffith also produced two policies issued to him by the defendant company when he took out similar insurance on two other vehicles. And judgment in the suit which the plaintiff brought against Mr. Selwyn Griffith was tendered by consent. The defendant's contention that the plaintiff has not proved that the judgment was in respect of a liability covered by the terms of the policy must therefore fail.
The next issue relates to the construction of concluding words of section 9(1) of the Act — “including any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.”
The question is whether these words operate to enlarge the liability of the insurer under the policy by requiring the insurer to pay the costs of a third party in obtaining judgment against a person insured and any interest awarded on the judgment, or whether the words merely serve to emphasise that the amount payable by the insurer is limited to the sum which he is required to pay under the policy and no more. In other words does the word “including”...
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