Hall v North Beach Company Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Barbados
• Judge: Husbands, C.J.,Belgrave, J.
• Judgment Date: 16 January 1989
• Court: Divisional Court (Barbados)
• Docket Number: No. 6 of 1988
• Date: 16 January 1989

Divisional Court

Husbands, C.J. (Ag.); Belgrave, J.

No. 6 of 1988

Hall

and

North Beach Company Limited

Appearances:

Mr. Alwyn Archer and Mr. Dereck Daniels for the appellant

Mr. Peter G. Symmonds for the respondent.

Real property - Recovery of possession — Landlord and tenant — Tenant ordered to give up possession by Magistrate — Appeal — Whether land is tenantry within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Tenantries Freehold Purchase Act 1980-53 — Land adjoins foreshore — Therefore not a tenancy — Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

1 This is an appeal from an order of the magistrate of District ‘E’ Holetown made on the 5th day of May, 1987 in which the appellant was ordered to give up to the respondent company on 30th June, 1987 possession of two parcels of land which she occupied as tenant. The grounds of appeal as originally filed are that:–

• (1) the decision is erroneous in point in law;

• (2) the decision is against the weight of the evidence;

• (3) some other specific error, not hereinbefore mentioned and affecting the merits of the case has been committed in the course of the proceedings of the case.

2 At the request of the court, learned council for the appellant, particularised the grounds on appeal as follows:–

• “1. That the learned trial magistrate erred in law in his interpretation of section 2 (b) of the Tenantries Freehold Purchase Act ( Act 1980-53) which defines the word “tenantry” as meaning

  • ‘(a) …

  • (b) An area of land that is subdivided before or after the commencement of this Act, into lots for letting as sites for chattel buildings to be used as dwelling-houses whether the land is vested in the Crown, in a Statutory Board or in any other person but does not include land adjoining the foreshore' in, that he held that the whole area of land situate at 2nd Avenue, Holetown, St. James was embraced or included in this definition and it is not a tenantry.’

• 2. That the learned trial magistrate failed to show “such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation of the Act 1980-53) as will best ensure the attainment of its purposes” in that he failed to consider the 1980-53 Act, the meaning of which would be inconsistent with his inpretation of section 2(b) in so far as the words ‘but exclusive of any land therefore that adjoins the foreshore’ in section 2(a) and ‘but does not include land adjoining the foreshore’ in section 2(b) are respectively concerned.

• 3. That the learned trial magistrate erred in law in finding that ‘on a close reading of the legislation, not all tenants were protected but only those who were occupying lots in a tenantry as defined by the Act’, in that no protection was given to tenants in either the Acts of 1980-53 or 1980-54.

• 4. That the learned trial magistrate erred in finding that in a North/South subdivision of the land where all lots ran parallel to each other and the foreshore, that the land adjoined the foreshore irrespective of how far removed from the foreshore each lot was.

• 5. That the learned trial magistrate having found that the “preliminary but most important point raised for determination was whether that area of land not the subject of this litigation and owned by the respondent/landlord and occupied by the appellant/tenant is a tenantry as defined by section 2(b) of the Tenantries Freehold Purchase Act 1980-53” failed to address his mind to other points of fact and law emanating from the evidence.

• 6. That the learned trial magistrate erred in finding that the land situate at 2nd Avenue, Holetown, St. James also known as Toppins Land is/was subdivided in five (5) lots since there was no evidence to support this finding of fact.

• 7. The learned trial magistrate erred in not making any finding of fact as to whether or not the respondent/landlord at the time of purchase of the said land on 26th of March, 1984, had notice of the appellant's/tenant's rights of occupation.

• 8. That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact when he failed to recognize and or rule that the appellant/tenant had vested rights since 1965 by virtue of the Tenantries Control Act, Cap. 239, sections 2 (1) and 2 (3).

• 9. That as a result of ground 8 hereof, the learned trial magistrate erred in law in making an order of ejectment. (As this was not canvassed in the court below, leave is now being sought to add it for consideration by the court.)”

3 The evidence of Peter Odle is that the respondent Company owns an area of land some 25,457 square feet at 2nd Avenue, Holetown, St. James, known as Toppins Land. The appellant is the weekly tenant of two (2) house spots on the said land designated as lots 1 and 4 and occupying a total area of 6,000 square feet.

4 By notice to quit in accordance with the provisions of the Security of Tenure of Small Holdings Act, Cap. 237 and dated 19th July, 1985, the respondent Company called upon the appellant to quit and deliver up possession of the two house spots on 31st January, 1986. On the failure by the appellant to quit, the respondent Company in accordance with the provisions of section 35 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, Cap. 230, by complaint,...