Norris v Norris et Al

JurisdictionBarbados
JudgeWilliams, J
Judgment Date24 June 1977
Neutral CitationBB 1977 HC 19
Docket NumberNo. 180 of 1975
CourtHigh Court (Barbados)
Date24 June 1977

High Court

Williams, J.

No. 180 of 1975

Norris
and
Norris et al

E. Alleyne and A. Shepherd for the plaintiff.

P. Williams and C. Herbert for the first named defendant.

C. E. Lashley for the second named defendant with J.S.B. Dear, Q.C.

Insurance - Life Insurance — Beneficiary

Facts: The employer of the deceased had taken out group insurance policies for its employees — The first defendant the widow of the deceased was named as his beneficiary — The issue for determination was whether the sums payable under the scheme should be paid to the plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of the deceased or to the first defendant

Held: The transaction being of a testamentary nature had to conform to the Wills Act 1891, and since it did not do so the appointment as beneficiary was invalid and ineffective — The insurance moneys should be paid to the plaintiff.

Williams, J
1

Evan Carlisle Norris, hereinafter called the deceased, died in this Island on November 3, 1973. Surviving him were the plaintiff whom he had married in 1968; the first named defendant Caroline who had been married to him but whose marriage to him had been dissolved earlier in the said year; and the second named defendant Waple, his sister.

2

The differences between the parties to this suit relate to insurance moneys and real property. On January 1, 1958 Constant Estates Ltd., the employer of deceased, had taken out group insurance policies for its employees with Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. Policy No. GT 1628-00-7 Certificate 129 and GP 1630-00-3. Certificate 13 were on the life of the deceased and for his benefit and on the death of the deceased $22,000.00 and $23,897.31 were the respective sums payable. The first named defendant (the wife at the time) was named as “beneficiary” and the issue is whether the sums (which the Company has paid into court) should be paid to her or to the plaintiff as qualified administratrix of the estate of the deceased.

3

Counsel for the plaintiff makes the following submissions –

  • (a) that the appointment by the deceased of the first named defendant as “beneficiary” under the policies was testamentary in character but was not made in the form required by the Wills Act, 1891 and was therefore invalid;

  • (b) even if the appointment was valid, it was revoked by the subsequent marriage of the deceased to the plaintiff in 1968;

  • (c) in the alternative, no valid trust was created in favour of the first named defendant either at common law or by virtue of s. 25 of the Married Women Act, Cap. 219.

4

Counsel for the first named defendant relies entirely on s. 25 of the Married Women Act Cap. 219 Subsection (2) of which provides as follows:–

  • “(2) A policy of assurance effected by any man on his own life and expressed to be for the benefit of his wife or of his children or of his wife and children or any of them or by any woman on her own life and expressed to be for the benefit of her husband or of her children or of her husband and children or any of them shall create a trust in favour of the objects therein named, and the moneys payable under any such policy shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains un-performed, from part of the estate of the insured or be subject to his or her debts.”

5

He submitted that the above provisions dispose of the issue. He referred in detail to Chapter 10 of Housman's Law of Life Insurance, 8 th Edition, 1975 which deals with policies under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the corresponding legislation of the United Kingdom. He cited in support of his contention Re Oakes' Settlement [1950] 2 All E.R. 851. but these authorities do not help him. S. 25 has no relevance to the matter before me because the policies were taken out not by the deceased but by his employers. In section 3 of Chapter 10 of Housman's Law of Life Insurance, above cited, it is stated that in order that a policy may create a trust under the section, it must fulfill certain requirements one of which is that it must be a policy effected by a man on his own life or by a woman on her own life. The section does not cover a policy taken out by a third party on a man's or a woman's life.

6

The question in Re Oakes' Settlement, above cited, related to the interpretation of a provision relating to estate duty and it was held that the person who took out the policy had “effected” the policy though the first two premiums had been paid by his wife's father. The facts here are different. The employers had negotiated the policies and were stated therein to be the policyholders. Moreover, they were liable for and had paid all the premiums. There can be no question that the policies had been effected, not by the deceased, but by his employers. Consequently, no trust arose in favour of the first defendant under section 25 of the Married Women Act, Cap. 219.

7

Was the appointment of the first defendant valid or invalid? The clause in one policy pursuant to which the nomination was made is as follows –

“21. Beneficiary. Insofar as the law governing the policy allows, an employee, by written notice in form satisfactory to the Insurance Company, can designate a beneficiary or beneficiaries for the insurance due under the policy on his death, and can similarly change the beneficiary designation from time to time. If any beneficiary dies before the employee, the interest of such beneficiary shall thereupon terminate unless otherwise provided by such written notice. The Insurance Company assumes no responsibility for the validity of any such written notice.”

8

The clause in the other policy is as follows:–

“An employee may, by written declaration, designate a beneficiary to receive any benefits payable at his death and may change his designation of beneficiary at any time, subject to statutory restrictions. If no beneficiary survive the employee, then the death benefit shall be payable to the employee's executors or administrators.”

9

The designation made by the deceased in the instant case was in each case as follows:–

“I hereby appoint the following beneficiary for any amount payable at my death in accordance with the terms of my coverage:

Mrs. Carolyn Elvina Norris wife.

I reserve the right to change the beneficiary in so far as it is legally permissible to do so.”

10

The designation in ach case was executed by the deceased in the presence of one witness.

11

Counsel drew my attention to two articles on this topic, one by W.F. Nunan in Volume 40 of the Australian Law Journal entitled “The Application of the Wills Acts to Nominations of Beneficiaries under Superanuation or Pension Schemes or Insurance Policies;” the other by W.J Chappenden in the...

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