Stare decisis and the development of Caribbean jurisprudence

AuthorRosalea Hamilton
PositionLL.B., Ph.D., Norman Manley Law School Mona, University of the West Indies, Jamaica
Pages330-350
STARE DECISIS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CARIBBEAN
JURISPRUDENCE
ROSALEA
HAMILTON*
INTRODUCTION
A
fundamental principle in all legal systems is that past decisions should mould
future decisions so that similar cases can be treated alike. This doctrine of
precedent significantly contributes to the stability and certainty desired in a
legal system. However, its usefulness in developing a Caribbean1 jurispru-
dence is limited. This is a very important concern for the Caribbean, especially
is light of current discussions about a Caribbean Court of Appeal where it is
explicitly or implicitly assumed that Caribbean jurisprudential decisions will
be espoused,
A prior question to any discussion of developing a Caribbean jurisprudence
is:
"Is there
a Caribbean
jurisprudence?"
Some may argue that
by
echoing British
precedents and, by implication, British jurisprudential thinking, there is
nothing "Caribbean" about jurisprudence practised in the region. If this is so,
should a "Caribbean jurisprudence" be developed? If one considers law as an
essentially abstract, objective set of rules/norms whose meaning
is
settled,2 then
*LL.B., Ph.D., Norman Manley Law School Mona, University of the West Indies, Jamaica.
All references to "Caribbean'' in this paper mean "Commonwealth Caribbean," i.e. chose countries
in the Caribbean that were once part of the British Commonwealth-
- This view is derived from Kelsen's "pure theory" which sees law purely in terms of reason, abstracting
from socially derived value-judgments. See Kelsem Pure
Theory
of Law (Knight trans, 1967). To a
lesser extent, it is also consistent with Hart's concept of
law;
see Hart, The
Concept
of Law (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1961).
the continued application of British rules and precedents to the Caribbean can
be perceived as acceptable without the need to develop a "Caribhean jurispru-
dence"
or the need to establish a Caribbean Court of
Appeal.
Jurists in the
region have traditionally held this view of law and, feeling bound by British
precedents, have practised "mechanical jurisprudence"3 rather than develop a
Caribbean jurisprudence. If, instead, one
sees
law as essentially
a
social process
that is shaped by society and in turn shapes society, then a Caribbean
jurisprudence is a necessary development.
This paper adopts the view that there is an embryonic, fledgling Caribbean
jurisprudence that is being stifled by the doctrine of
stare
decisis.
Caribbean
jurisprudence will flourish only if judges move away from the stria binding
approach to British precedents. In examining this proposition, the doctrine of
stare decisis will be carefully examined, clarifying the distinction between a strict
binding precedent and a
less
strict approach to the doctrine of precedent and
discussing the controversy about the authoritative status of precedents. Next,
the strengths and weaknesses of the doctrine of
stare decisis
will be discussed.
Then, a conception of a desirable Caribbean jurisprudence will be offered as
well as a discussion of the extent to which the doctrine of binding precedent
has stifled its development. Finally, some concluding remarks,
THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
In analysing this doctrine, an important distinction can and should be made
between precedents in civil and common law countries. In civil law countries
based on Roman
law,
precedents may
be
followed and commonly
are,
but there
is no rule requiring one court to follow the decision of another where the facts
appear to be similar. Here it is assumed that legal rules applicable to any
particular case are fixed and codified so judges apply the rules without reliance
on personal views or interpretations of
others.
Although individual decisions
contain no future authority In themselves, they have value and judges do not
ignore them.
In common law countries, like Britain and the Commonwealth, the systems
of precedents carry much more weight. The doctrine of binding precedents
3 The
term was
used
by Roscoe
Pound in "Mechanical
Jurisprudence"
(1908) 8
Columbia
Law
Review
605
and applied to Caribbean judges by Howard Malcolm in "Towards the Emergence of an
Anglo-West
Indian Jurisprudence," (1993) 18
West Indian Law
Journal
53.

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